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ORIGINS OF THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: FROM NUREMBERG TO 
PARIS
William A. Schabas* 
In his remarks at the September 28, 2007 symposium commemorat-
ing the adoption of the Genocide Convention, held at Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law, former war crimes prosecutor Henry T. King, Jr. 
described meeting Raphael Lemkin in Nuremberg’s Grand Hotel in 1946. 
Lemkin first proposed the term “genocide” in his 1944 book Axis Rule in 
Occupied Europe.1 Professor King said he found Lemkin to be a “crank,” 
adding that “[a]t that time, he was unshaven, his clothing was in tatters and 
he looked dishevelled.” King continued: 
Lemkin was very upset. He was concerned that the decision of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal—the Nuremberg Court—did not go far enough in 
dealing with genocidal actions. This was because the IMT limited its 
judgment to wartime genocide and did not include peacetime genocide. At 
that time, Lemkin was very focused on pushing his points. After he had 
buttonholed me several times, I had to tell him that I was powerless to do 
anything about the limitation in the Court’s judgment.2
Lemkin was not the only person at the time to express displeasure with the 
Nuremberg Tribunal’s decision to leave unpunished Nazi atrocities commit-
ted against Jews and other minorities within Germany prior to the outbreak 
of the war on September 1, 1939. 
Within days of the Nuremberg judgment, issued on September 30 
and October 1, 1946, three United Nations Member States—India, Cuba, 
and Panama—proposed a resolution along the lines of Lemkin’s comments 
to Henry King at the General Assembly’s first session. Cuban Delegate 
 *  William A. Schabas is the Director of the Irish Centre for Human Rights at the Na-
tional University of Ireland, Galway, where he also holds the chair in human rights law. 
Professor Schabas is a Global Legal Scholar at the University of Warwick School of Law 
and a visiting professor at Queen’s University Belfast School of Law and Benjamin N. Car-
dozo School of Law. 
 1 See RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF OCCUPATION,
ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 79 (1944). 
2 Henry T. King, Jr., Remarks at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Freder-
ick K. Cox International Law Center Symposium: To Prevent and to Punish: An International 
Conference in Commemoration of the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Negotiation of the Geno-
cide Convention (Sept. 27, 2007), reprinted in 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 13–14, webcast 
available at http://law.case.edu/centers/cox/webcast.asp?dt=20070928& type=wmv &a=3. 
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Ernesto Dihigo explained that the resolution was necessary to address a 
shortcoming in the Nuremberg trial by which acts committed prior to the 
war were left unpunished.3 One of the preambular paragraphs in the draft 
resolution stated: 
Whereas the punishment of the very serious crime of genocide when 
committed in time of peace lies within the exclusive territorial jurisdiction 
of the judiciary of every State concerned, while crimes of a relatively less-
er importance such as piracy, trade in women, children, drugs, obscene 
publications are declared as international crimes and have been made mat-
ters of international concern . . .4
This paragraph never made it into the final version of Resolution 96(I) be-
cause the majority of the General Assembly was not prepared to recognize 
universal jurisdiction for the crime of genocide.5 Nevertheless, the resolu-
tion, somewhat toned down from the 
hopes of those who had proposed it, 
launched a process that concluded two 
years later with the adoption of the 
Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide,6 which met in Paris at the Palais 
de Chaillot in late 1948. 
Thus, the recognition of ge-
nocide as an international crime by the 
General Assembly of the United Na-
tions, and its codification in the 1948 
Convention, can be understood as a 
reaction to the IMT’s Nuremberg 
judgment. It was Nuremberg’s failure 
to recognize the international crimi-
nality of atrocities committed in 
peacetime that prompted the first in-
itiatives at codifying the crime of ge-
nocide. Had Nuremberg recognized 
the reach of international criminal law into peacetime atrocities, we might 
never have seen a genocide convention. Raphael Lemkin would probably be 
no more than an obscure and eccentric personality, as Henry King remem-
bered him in the Grand Hotel in Nuremberg, rather than the distinguished 
3 U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., 2nd plen. Mtg., at 101, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.22 (Nov. 22, 1946).  
4 U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/BUR/50 (Nov. 2, 1946). 
 5 See generally G.A. Res. 96 (I), at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (Dec. 11, 1946).  
 6 See generally Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
G.A. Res. 260 (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 9, 1948).  
Paying my respects to Raphael 
Lemkin at Mount Hebron 
Cemetery
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“Father of the Genocide Convention.”7
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND THE DRAFTING OF THE 1948 GENOCIDE
CONVENTION
The remarks by Dihigo during the first session of the General As-
sembly were only the prelude to a protracted debate about the relationship 
between genocide and crimes against humanity. Controversy arose repeat-
edly on the subject in 1947 and 1948 as the Genocide Convention was being 
drafted. General Assembly Resolution 96(I) was adopted immediately after 
another resolution, Resolution 95(I), which called for the preparation of the 
“Nuremberg Principles.”8 Reference to Nuremberg suggested crimes against 
humanity, rather than genocide. Although there were occasional references 
to the word “genocide” during the Nuremberg trial, the Tribunal’s Charter 
dealt with Nazi atrocities against Jews and other vulnerable minorities under 
the concept of crimes against humanity. Thus, the General Assembly was 
already making an implied distinction between crimes against humanity and 
genocide. Resolution 96(I) did not use the expression “crimes against hu-
manity.” 
General Assembly Resolution 96(I) assigned responsibility for 
preparation of the Convention to the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC). The resolution requested the ECOSOC “to undertake the ne-
cessary studies, with a view to drawing up a draft convention on the crime 
of genocide to be submitted to the next regular session of the General As-
sembly.” ECOSOC rejected suggestions from the Secretary-General that the 
matter be referred to the Commission on Human Rights or to a special 
committee of the Council.9 The Secretary-General turned to three experts, 
Raphael Lemkin, Henri Donnedieu de Vabres, a professor at the University 
of Paris Law Faculty and a former judge of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and 
Vespasian V. Pella, a Romanian law professor and President of the Interna-
tional Association for Penal Law. The Secretary-General felt that genocide 
should be defined so as not to encroach “on other notions, which logically 
are and should be distinct.”10 This was an oblique reference to “crimes 
against humanity,” which had been defined in the Nuremberg Tribunal’s 
Charter and applied in its 1946 judgment.  
7 These words are engraved on Mr. Lemkin’s tombstone in New York’s Mount Hebron 
Cemetery, which Don Ferencz and I visited to pay our respects a few days before the confe-
rence at Case Western Reserve University on September 28, 2007. 
8 G.A. Res. 95 (I), at 188, U.N. Doc. A/236 (Dec. 11, 1946). 
9 The Secretary-General, Note by the Secretary-General on the Crime of Genocide, U.N. 
Doc. E/330 (Mar. 12, 1947). 
10 The Secretary-General, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, 15, delivered to the 
Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. E/447 (June 26, 1947). 
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The Secretariat prepared a draft convention, which was accompa-
nied by the three experts’ comments.11 On June 13, 1947, it was sent to the 
Committee on the Progressive Development of International Law and Its 
Codification—the forerunner of the International Law Commission—for 
comments.12 France circulated a memorandum “on the subject of genocide 
and crimes against humanity” which challenged the use of the term “geno-
cide,” calling it “a useless and even dangerous neologism.” France preferred 
to approach the problem of extermination of racial, social, political or reli-
gious groups from the standpoint of crimes against humanity.13 Somewhat 
later, France insisted that the proposed convention should affirm its rela-
tionship with the principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and explain that 
genocide was merely one aspect of crimes against humanity.14 The French 
position did not find widespread support. But it highlights the nature of the 
debate at the time. France viewed genocide as synonymous with crimes 
against humanity. It insisted upon the principles that were established at 
Nuremberg, including the rejection of “peacetime genocide.” Others, of 
course, saw the evolving law on genocide as a way to set aside the Nurem-
berg precedent.
Later in 1947, the fate of the draft convention was considered by the 
General Assembly at its second session. The United Kingdom, which had 
been hostile to the whole idea of a convention, proposed that the matter be 
assigned to the International Law Commission, given its ongoing work con-
cerning the Nuremberg Principles, and what was described as a close rela-
tionship between genocide and crimes against humanity.15 This would have 
had the practical consequence of blurring the line between General Assem-
bly Resolution 95(I), concerning the Nuremberg Principles, and 96(I), man-
dating the preparation of a convention on genocide. It was the “third world” 
countries of Panama, Cuba, and India that had launched Resolution 96(I) in 
1946. As negotiation of the convention itself proceeded, once again “third 
world” countries led the battle for the autonomy of the concept of genocide. 
When the United Kingdom and others tried to sidetrack the convention by 
referring it to the International Law Commission, and muddying the entire 
concept by linking it to the Nuremberg Principles, Panama’s Ricardo J. Al-
faro protested that “what was yesterday a conviction or a decision that a 
11 The Secretary-General, Report and the Draft Convention of the General Secretariat, 
U.N. Doc. A/AC.10/41 (June 26, 1947). 
12 The Secretary-General, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.10/42/Add.1 (June 10, 1947). 
13 U.N. Doc. A/AC.20/29. 
14 Communication from French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Draft Convention on the 
Crime of Genocide, para. 2, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/401/Add.3 
(Oct. 31, 1947). 
15 U.N. Doc. A/PV.123 (Davies, United Kingdom). 
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certain thing had to be done, appears today beclouded by doubts and is a 
subject of consultation.”16 Panama, Cuba, Egypt, and China took initiatives 
to put the convention back on the rails, all the time reinforcing the distinc-
tion between the Nuremberg Principles project and the Genocide Conven-
tion.17 The heart of the issue was whether to consider genocide as a variety 
of crime against humanity, or to treat it as a distinct form of criminal beha-
vior. A Chinese amendment implying the latter was adopted on a roll-call 
vote.18
The ECOSOC established an Ad Hoc Committee to review the Se-
cretariat draft.19 The Secretariat proposed that the Ad Hoc Committee con-
sider various substantive questions, including the relationship between ge-
nocide and crimes against humanity.20 In accordance with a suggestion from 
the Secretariat, the debate arose in the context of discussion of the pream-
ble. Once again, France was insistent about the linkage between genocide 
and crimes against humanity, while others were equally firm in their view 
that the concepts had to be made distinct and separate. France had, in fact, 
urged that the preamble describe genocide as “a crime against humanity,”21
but the Ad Hoc Committee rejected this, choosing instead to characterize it 
as “a crime against mankind.”22 According to the Committee’s final report, 
its members “categorically opposed the expression ‘crimes against humani-
ty’ because, in their opinion, it had acquired a well defined legal meaning in 
the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal.”23 France had somewhat more suc-
cess with its proposal that the preamble refer to the IMT.24 Lebanon ob-
jected, saying that the Nuremberg trial dealt with crimes against humanity 
and not genocide.25 Venezuela also opposed any reference to Nuremberg.26
The reasons for the opposition stemmed from the same concern, namely that 
16 U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.59. 
 17 Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, Cuba, Egypt and Panama: Amendment 
Proposal, U.N. Doc. A/512 (Nov. 21, 1947).  
18 U.N. Doc. A/PV.123, p. 241. 
19 S.C. Res. 117 (VI), at 19, U.N. Doc. E/734 (Mar. 3, 1948). 
20 Memorandum from the Secretariat, Ad Hoc Comm. on Genocide, List of Substantive 
Items to be Discussed in the Remaining Stages of the Committee’s Sessions, at 2, U.N. Doc. 
E/AC.25/11 (Apr. 21, 1948). 
21 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Ad Hoc Comm. on Genocide, Summary 
Record of the Twentieth Meeting, at 7, U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR.20 (Apr. 21, 2948). 
22 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Ad Hoc Comm. on Genocide, Report of the 
Committee and Draft Convention Drawn up by the Committee, at 6, U.N. Doc. E/794 (May 
24, 1948) (prepared by Karim Azkoul). 
 23 Id. at 7. 
24 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Ad Hoc Comm. on Genocide, Summary of the 
Record of the Twenty-Third Meeting, at 3, U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR.23 (May 4, 1948). 
 25 Id. at 4. 
 26 Id. at 4–5. 
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the crime of genocide might be confused with the crimes against humanity 
that had been judged by the IMT.27
The final version of the Convenion was drafted in the Sixth Com-
mittee of the General Assembly, which met in Paris in late 1948. The 
United Nations Secretariat prepared a note addressing the relationship be-
tween genocide and crimes against humanity, but insisted upon the utility of 
a distinct crime of genocide principally because it would enable avoidance 
of the nexus with armed conflict.28 There was considerable discussion as to 
whether or not genocide was an autonomous infraction or in the form of a 
crime against humanity. France prepared a rival draft convention. Article I 
of its text began by affirming that “[t]he crime against humanity known as 
genocide is an attack on the life of a human group or of an individual as a 
member of such group, particularly by reason of his nationality, race, reli-
gion or opinions.”29 This was, of course, connected with the idea—included 
in the final version of article I—that genocide was a crime that could be 
committed in time of peace or of war.30 Brazil’s representative to the Sixth 
Committee said that crimes against humanity, as defined in the Nuremberg 
Charter, did encompass genocide, but only to the extent they were commit-
ted during or in connection with the preparation of war. Genocide, however, 
had to be defined as a crime that could also be committed in a time of 
peace.31 The Brazilian delegate noted the confusion at Nuremberg about the 
scope of the term “crimes against humanity” and said, “In view of the 
vagueness about the concept of crimes against humanity, it would be well to 
define genocide as a separate crime committed against certain groups of 
human beings as such.”32 The debate also arose in the context of the pream-
ble. Venezuela submitted a draft preamble that it explained had omitted any 
27 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Ad Hoc Comm. on Genocide, Report of the 
Committee and Draft Convention Drawn up by the Committee, at 9, U.N. Doc. E/794 (May 
24, 1948) (prepared by Karim Azkoul). 
28 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Ad Hoc Comm. On Genocide, Relations Be-
tween the Convention on Genocide on the One hand and the Formulation of the Nurnberg 
Principles and the Preparation of a Draft Code of Offences Against Peace and Security on 
the Other, at 5–6, U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/3 (Apr. 2, 1948). 
29 France: Draft Convention on Genocide, Draft Convention and Report of the Economic 
and Social Council, art. 1, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/211 (Oct. 1, 
1948); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sixth Comm., Continuation of the Consid-
eration of the Draft Convention on Genocide, at 34, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.67 (Oct. 5, 1948). 
30 See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sixth Comm., Continuation of the 
Consideration of the Draft Convention on Genocide, at 38, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.67 (Oct. 5, 
1948); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sixth Comm., Continuation of the Consider-
ation of the Draft Convention on Genocide, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.68 (Oct. 6, 1948).  
31 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sixth Comm., Continuation of the Considera-
tion of the Draft Convention on Genocide, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.63 (Sept. 30, 1948) 
(Amado, Brazil). 
 32 Id. at 6–7. 
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reference to the Nuremberg Tribunal, because genocide was distinct from 
crimes against humanity.33 France had its own proposals for the preamble, 
of which the most significant was addition of a reference to the Nuremberg 
judgment.34 Ultimately, of course, no reference either to Nuremberg or to 
crimes against humanity was incorporated in the final text of the Conven-
tion adopted by the General Assembly on December 9, 1948. 
GENOCIDE AT NUREMBERG
Yet, Nuremberg and genocide—not to mention crimes against hu-
manity—were most certainly joined at the hip. Many who are unfamiliar 
with the text of the Nuremberg judgment are surprised to see the relatively 
small part played in it by the Holocaust. Certainly, in the popular perception 
of the Nuremberg trial, Nazi persecution of European Jews was the central 
issue.
The word itself was first proposed by Lemkin in his 1944 book Axis 
Rule in Occupied Europe.35 Within months, it was being used widely to 
refer to Nazi atrocities. In his planning memorandum distributed to delega-
tions at the beginning of London Conference in June 1945, Justice Robert 
Jackson had outlined the evidence he planned to adduce in the trial. Refer-
ring to “[p]roof of the defendant’s atrocities and other crimes,” he included, 
“[g]enocide or destruction of racial minorities and subjugated populations 
by such means and methods as (1) underfeeding; (2) sterilization and castra-
tion; (3) depriving them of clothing, shelter, fuel, sanitation, medical care; 
(4) deporting them for forced labor; (5) working them in inhumane condi-
tions.”36 The IMT’s indictment charged the Nazi defendants with deliberate 
and systematic genocide, viz., the extermination of racial and national 
groups, against the civilian populations of certain occupied territories in 
order to destroy particular races and classes of people, and national, racial 
33 U.N. Econ. & Social Council, Sixth Comm. [ECOSOC], Continuation of the Considera-
tion of the Draft Convention on Genocide, at 489, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.109 (Nov. 17, 1948). 
34 France: Amendments to the Preamble to the Draft Convention, Genocide: Draft Con-
vention and Report of the Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/267 (Nov. 15, 
1948) (“Substitute the following for the third sub-paragraph: ‘Having taken note of the legal 
precedent established by the judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nürnberg of 
30 September–1 October 1946.’”); Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Amendments to the 
Draft Convention (E/794), Genocide: Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and 
Social Council, 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/215/Rev.1 (Oct. 9, 1948) (“Having taken note of the fact 
that the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in its judgments of 30 September–1 
October 1946 has punished under a different legal description certain persons who have 
committed acts similar to those which the present Convention aims at punishing.”). 
 35 See LEMKIN, supra note 1.
36 ROBERT H. JACKSON, REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE 
TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS 68 (Dep’t of State Publication 
1949) [hereinafter JACKSON REPORT]. 
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or religious groups, particularly Jews, Poles, and Gypsies.”37 The United 
Nations War Crimes Commission later observed that “[b]y inclusion of this 
specific charge the Prosecution attempted to introduce and to establish a 
new type of international crime.”38 During the trial, Sir David Maxwell-
Fyfe, the British prosecutor, reminded one of the accused, Von Neurath, that 
he had been charged with genocide  
which we say is the extermination of racial and national groups, or, as it 
has been put in the well-known book of Professor Lemkin, “a co-ordinated 
plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations 
of the life of national groups with the aim of annihilating the groups them-
selves.”39
In his closing argument, the French prosecutor, Champetier de Ribes, stated 
“[t]his is a crime so monstrous, so undreamt of in history through the Chris-
tian era up to the birth of Hitlerism, that the term ‘genocide’ had to be 
coined to define it.”40 He spoke of “the greatest crime of all, genocide.”41
The British prosecutor, Sir Hartley Shawcross, also used the term in his 
summation: “Genocide was not restricted to extermination of the Jewish 
people or of the gypsies. It was applied in different forms to Yugoslavia, to 
the non-German inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, to the people of the Low 
Countries and of Norway.”42 Shawcross referred to how “[t]he aims of ge-
nocide were formulated by Hitler.”43 He went on to explain: “The Nazis 
also used various biological devices, as they have been called, to achieve 
genocide. They deliberately decreased the birth rate in the occupied coun-
tries by sterilization, castration, and abortion, by separating husband from 
wife and men from women and obstructing marriage.”44 Although the final 
judgment in the Trial of the Major War Criminals, issued September 30 and 
October 1, 1946, never used the term, it described at some length what was 
in fact the crime of genocide. Lemkin later wrote that “[t]he evidence pro-
duced at the Nuremberg trial gave full support to the concept of geno-
cide.”45
But genocide was not, in fact, a crime under the Charter of the In-
37 Trials of the Major War Criminals (France v. Goering), 22 IMT 43–44 (Oct. 1, 1946). 
38 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR 
CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 197 (1948). 
39 Trials of the Major War Criminals (France v. Goering), 17 IMT 61 (June 25, 1946). 
40 Trials of the Major War Criminals (France v. Goering), 19 IMT 531 (July 29, 1946).  
 41 Id. at 562. 
 42 Id. at 497. 
 43 Id. at 494. 
 44 Id. at 498. 
45 Raphael Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime in International Law, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 145, 
147 (1947). 
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ternational Military Tribunal. Instead, what must at the time have been 
viewed as a cognate concept, crimes against humanity, formed the legal 
basis of the prosecution. The efforts at definition of this new category of 
international crime reveal why the fabled nexus with armed conflict was 
inserted into the provision used at the Nuremberg trial. 
In the Legal Committee of the United Nations War Crimes Com-
mission, the United States representative Herbert C. Pell had used the term 
“crimes against humanity” to describe offences “committed against stateless 
persons or against any persons because of their race or religion.”46 But more 
frequently, the concept was described using terms like “atrocity” and “per-
secution.” In May 1944, the Legal Committee submitted a draft resolution 
to the plenary Commission urging it to adopt a broad view of its mandate, 
and to address “crimes committed against any persons without regard to 
nationality, stateless persons included, because of race, nationality, religious 
or political belief, irrespective of where they have been committed.”47 Lord 
Simon, who was the British Lord Chancellor, responded: 
This would open a very wide field. No doubt you have in mind particularly 
the atrocities committed against the Jews. I assume there is no doubt that 
the massacres which have occurred in occupied territories would come 
within the category of war crimes and there would be no question as to 
their being within the Commission’s terms of reference. No doubt they are 
part of a policy which the Nazi Government have adopted from the outset, 
and I can fully understand the Commission wishing to receive and consid-
er and report on evidence which threw light on what one might describe as 
the extermination policy. I think I can probably express the view of His 
Majesty’s Government by saying that it would not desire the Commission 
to place any unnecessary restriction on the evidence which may be ten-
dered to it on this general subject. I feel I should warn you, however, that 
the question of acts of this kind committed in enemy territory raises se-
rious difficulties.48
The United States Department of State was decidedly lukewarm to the idea 
that war crimes prosecutions might innovate and hold Germans accountable 
for crimes committed against minority groups within their own borders.49
46 ARIEH J. KOCHAVI, PRELUDE TO NUREMBERG: ALLIED WAR CRIMES POLICY AND THE 
QUESTION OF PUNISHMENT 146 (1998); THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION,
HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION 175 (1948) (quoting Resolution 
moved by Mr. Pell, U.N. War Crimes Commission, Comm. II, U.N. Doc. III/I, 18.3.44 (Mar. 
16, 1944)). 
47 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra note 38, at 176. 
48 Correspondence Between the War Crimes Commission and HM Government in London 
Regarding the Punishment of Crimes Committed on Religious, Racial or Political Grounds, 
UNWCC Doc. C.78 (Feb. 15, 1945) (on file with the National Archives of Canada RG-25, 
Vol. 3033, 4060-40C, Part Four). 
 49 See ARIEH J. KOCHAVI, supra note 46, at 149; see also Shlomo Aronson, Preparations 
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This was reminiscent of the position taken by Robert Lansing and James 
Brown Scott as representatives of the United States in 1919.50
But over the following months, the position of the major powers, 
including the United States, evolved. A May 16, 1945 draft from the United 
States government developed during the San Francisco conference, pro-
vided for a tribunal with jurisdiction to try “[a]trocities and offences com-
mitted since 1933 in violation of any applicable provision of the domestic 
law of any of the parties or of [sic] Axis Power or satellite, including atroci-
ties and persecutions on racial or religious grounds.”51 At the London Con-
ference, which began on June 26, 1945, the United States submitted a text 
that drew on the Martens clause of the Hague conventions. But the reference 
to “the principles of the law of nations as they result from the usages estab-
lished among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the 
dictates of the public conscience” was linked to the crime of aggression.52
The record of the meetings leaves no doubt that the four powers insisted 
upon a nexus between the war itself and the atrocities committed by the 
Nazis against their own Jewish populations. It was on this basis and this 
basis alone, that they considered themselves entitled to contemplate prose-
cution. The distinctions were set out by the head of the United States dele-
gation, Robert Jackson, at a meeting on July 23, 1945: 
It has been a general principle of foreign policy of our Government from 
time immemorial that the internal affairs of another government are not 
ordinarily our business; that is to say, the way Germany treats its inhabi-
tants, or any other country treats its inhabitants is not our affair any more 
than it is the affair of some other government to interpose itself in our 
problems. The reason that this program of extermination of Jews and de-
struction of the rights of minorities becomes an international concern is 
this: it was a part of a plan for making an illegal war. Unless we have a 
war connection as a basis for reaching them, I would think we have no ba-
sis for dealing with atrocities. They were a part of the preparation for war 
or for the conduct of the war in so far as they occurred inside of Germany 
and that makes them our concern.53
for the Nuremberg Trial: The O.S.S., Charles Dworak, and the Holocaust, 12 HOLOCAUST &
GENOCIDE STUD. 257, 259 (1998). 
50 VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR: REPORTS OF MAJORITY AND 
DISSENTING REPORTS OF AMERICA AND JAPANESE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION OF 
RESPONSIBILITIES: CONFERENCE OF PARIS, 1919 v–vi (1919).
51 THE AMERICAN ROAD TO NUREMBERG, THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD 1944–1945 195 
(Bradley F. Smith ed., 1982). 
52 Revised Draft of Agreement and Memorandum Submitted by American Delegation on 
June 30, 1945, in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 36, at 68–121.  
53 Minutes of the International Conference on Military Trials Session of July 23, 1945, in 
JACKSON REPORT, supra note 36, at 328–31.  
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Speaking of the proposed crime of “atrocities, persecutions, and deporta-
tions on political, racial or religious grounds,” Justice Jackson indicated the 
source of the lingering concerns of his government: 
[O]rdinarily we do not consider that the acts of a government toward its 
own citizens warrant our interference. We have some regrettable circums-
tances at times in our own country in which minorities are unfairly 
treated. We think it is justifiable that we interfere or attempt to bring retri-
bution to individuals or to states only because the concentration camps and 
the deportations were in pursuance of a common plan or enterprise of 
making an unjust or illegal war in which we became involved. We see no 
other basis on which we are justified in reaching the atrocities which were 
committed inside Germany, under German law, or even in violation of 
German law, by authorities of the German state.54
There can be little doubt that Jackson was not proud of the “regrettable cir-
cumstances” in the United States “in which minorities are unfairly treated.” 
But as a representative of his government, he could not agree with anything 
by which international law would recognize as a crime acts of persecution 
based on racial origin, because this might, at least in theory, expose United 
States officials to prosecution. The result was an agreement by the four 
“Great Powers” at the London Conference under which Nazi leaders could 
be prosecuted for such atrocities because they were committed in associa-
tion with the war. 
Article IV(c) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal-
defines ‘crimes against humanity’ as murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian popu-
lation, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or reli-
gious grounds in furtherance of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the International Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the 
domestic law of the country where perpetrated.”55 In the Nuremberg Tri-
bunal’s final judgment—implicitly addressing the issue of the nexus be-
tween crimes against humanity and the war itself, something that appeared 
fundamental in order to comply with the Charter of the Tribunal—the 
judges noted that “[i]t was contended for the Prosecution that certain aspects 
of this anti-Semitic policy were connected with the plans for aggressive 
war.”56 The Tribunal made a distinction between pre-war persecution of 
German Jews, which it characterized as “severe and repressive,” and Ger-
man policy during the war in the occupied territories. Although the judg-
 54 Id. at 333. 
55 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the Euro-
pean Axis art. 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 UNTS 279. 
56 Trials of the Major War Criminals (France v. Goering), 22 IMT 203, 492 (Oct. 1, 
1946).
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ment frequently referred to events during the 1930s, none of the accused 
was found guilty of an act perpetrated prior to September 1, 1939, the day 
the war broke out. This was the situation about which Raphael Lemkin was 
so agitated in October 1946 when he met Henry King in the lobby of Nu-
remberg’s Grand Hotel. 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AFTER NUREMBERG
It is often said that crimes against humanity were recognized as part 
of customary international law prior to Nuremberg. This is one way of ans-
wering the charge that the IMT breached the principle of legality (nullum 
crimen sine lege). Reference to the debates in the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission and the London Conference should be enough to show 
just how unclear the state of customary law actually was. Whether it was 
unfair to prosecute the Nazis for their atrocities is another matter altogether. 
The Nuremberg judges famously said that nullum crimen was a “principle 
of justice”: 
To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties and 
assurances have attacked neighbouring states without warning is obviously 
untrue, for in such circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing 
wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if 
his wrong were allowed to go unpunished.57
The principle of legality was most adequately addressed with re-
spect to the crime of genocide, through the adoption of General Assembly 
Resolution 98(I) in December 1946 and, two years later, the Genocide Con-
vention itself. The legal certainty that this codification accomplished no 
doubt contributed to the stability of the definition over the ensuing six dec-
ades. Although academics and human rights activists criticized the narrow-
ness of the definition, States rarely showed any inclination to consider 
amendment. They were given a golden opportunity at the 1998 Rome Con-
ference to fix any “blind spots” in the definition of genocide set out in arti-
cle II of the Convention, but declined to do so. In debate in the Committee 
of the Whole at the Rome Conference, only Cuba argued again for amend-
ment of the definition to include social and political groups.58 Otherwise, 
there was a chorus of support for the original text adopted by the General 
Assembly some fifty years earlier.59
 57 Id. at 462. 
58 Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, Consideration of the Question Concerning the Finalization and Adoption of a 
Convention on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in Accordance with 
General Assembly Resolutions 51/207 of 17 December 1996 and 52/160 of 15 December 
1997, para. 100, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.3 (Nov. 20, 1998). 
 59 Id. at paras. 2, 18, 20 (Germany), 22 (Syria), 24 (United Arab Emirates), 26 (Bahrain), 
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Crimes against humanity, on the other hand, lingered on after Nur-
emberg in a fog of uncertainty. In sharp contrast with genocide, the defini-
tion of which has remained unchanged for nearly six decades, it seems that 
the result is different each time crimes against humanity is defined. As its 
first projects, the International Law Commission had been given the task 
both of identifying the ‘Nuremberg Principles’ and developing a “Code of 
Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.” Principle VI of the 
“Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nurnberg 
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal,” adopted by the Commission 
in 1950,60 concerned subject matter jurisdiction. Crimes against humanity 
were defined as “[m]urder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and 
other inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on 
political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such perse-
cutions are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime 
against peace or any war crime.” The wording was not identical to that of 
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, but it actually clarified 
and entrenched the significance and scope of the nexus. The Commission 
said it did not exclude the possibility that crimes against humanity could be 
committed in time of peace, but only to the extent that they took place “be-
fore a war in connexion with crimes against peace.”61 
Critics of the nexus often point to Control Council: Law No. 10,62
which was adopted by the Allies for the purpose of prosecutions within 
Germany. The famous nexus had disappeared from the definition of crimes 
against humanity. But this can be easily explained by the fact that the Allies 
believed they were enacting national law applicable to Germany rather than 
international law with the potential to apply to themselves, which had been 
the case at Nuremberg. United States prosecutor Telford Taylor observed in 
his final report to the Secretary of the Army that “[n]one of the Nuremberg 
judgments squarely passed on the question whether mass atrocities commit-
ted by or with the approval of a government against a racial or religious 
28 (Jordan), 29 (Lebanon), 30 (Belgium), 31 (Saudi Arabia), 33 (Tunisia), 35 (Czech Repub-
lic), 38 (Morocco), 40 (Malta), 41 (Algeria), 44 (India), 49 (Brazil), 54 (Denmark), 57 (Leso-
tho), 59 (Greece), 64 (Malawi), 67 (Sudan), 72 (China), 76 (Republic of Korea), 80 (Poland), 
84 (Trinidad and Tobago), 85 (Iraq), 107 (Thailand), 111 (Norway), 113 (Côte d’Ivoire), 116 
(South Africa), 119 (Egypt), 122 (Pakistan), 123 (Mexico), 127 (Libya), 132 (Colombia), 
135 (Iran), 137 (United States of America), 141 (Djibouti), 143 (Indonesia), 145 (Spain), 150 
(Romania), 151 (Senegal), 153 (Sri Lanka), 157 (Venezuela), 161 (Italy), 166 (Ireland), 172 
(Turkey), 174. 
 60 Formulation of the Nürnberg Principles, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n paras. 95–127, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER.A/1950/Add. 1. 
 61 Id. at para. 123. 
62 Control Council Law No. 10 (1945). The document was enacted by the Commanders of 
the four zones of occupation in postwar Germany. It created a framework for the post-World 
War II trials of German military and civilian personnel. Id.
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group of its own inhabitants in peacetime constitute crimes under interna-
tional law.”63 Taylor said that the practical significance of this problem 
could hardly be overstated, and cited the 1948 Genocide Convention, which 
had just been drafted when he penned these words, as a manifestation of the 
interest in this question.64
The International Law Commission returned to the debate about the 
nexus in the definition of crimes against humanity proposed in its first draft 
of the Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 
adopted in 1951. Crime No. VIII consisted of two components, genocide 
and crimes against humanity. The provision was drawn from article II of the 
Genocide Convention and article VI(c) of the London Charter.65 “That ge-
nocide cannot be omitted from the draft code should not be questioned,” 
wrote Special Rapporteur Jean Spiropoulos in his report.66 But, he added, 
the distinction between genocide and crimes against humanity was “not 
easy to draw,” citing the commentary in the case reports of post-war trials, 
stating that “[w]hile the two concepts may overlap, genocide is different 
from crimes against humanity in that, to prove it, no connexion with war 
need be shown and, on the other hand, genocide is aimed against groups 
whereas crimes against humanity do not necessarily involve offences 
against or persecutions of groups.”67 There was open disagreement among 
members of the Commission about the relationship between genocide and 
crimes against humanity. Chaumont of France insisted that the concept of 
crime against humanity had been incorporated in the Genocide Convention, 
and that it was therefore “contrary to existing international law to lay down 
as a principle that crimes against humanity were inseparably linked with 
crimes against peace or war crimes.”68 Spiropoulos, on the other hand, con-
sidered that the Nuremberg Charter had exhaustively defined crimes against 
humanity. Spiropoulos believed 
that crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide were two quite dif-
ferent things. Doubtless, the crime of genocide might constitute a crime 
against humanity, but only if it was perpetrated against a group of human 
beings either in wartime or in connexion with crimes against peace or war 
63 TELFORD TAYLOR ET. AL., 1 FINAL REPORT TO SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE 
NUERNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 224 (1949).
 64 Id. at 226. 
65 Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l 
L. Comm’n 65, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/25. 
 66 Id. at 263. 
67 Id.
 68 Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1951] 2 Y.B. Int’l 
L. Comm’n 55, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1951/Add. 1. 
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crimes.69
The Commission’s 1951 draft was submitted to Member States for 
their comments. When the Commission returned to the code, in 1954, Spi-
ropoulos said that the comments on the genocide provision were conflicting 
and he had therefore decided not to make any changes. Consequently, the 
International Law Commission in 1954 adopted the draft code’s genocide 
provision, with only a slight departure from the text of article II of the Con-
vention.70 An important development in the 1954 draft concerned the “in-
human acts” paragraph (really, “crimes against humanity”), which had been 
coupled with the definition of genocide in the 1951 draft. The phrase “when 
such acts are committed in execution of or in connexion with other offences 
defined in this article” was eliminated, by a close vote of six to five, with 
one abstention.71 This did not resolve the problem, however, as members of 
the Commission soon recognized, because absent the nexus with crimes 
against peace and war crimes, the Commission did not see how a distinction 
could be made between ordinary crimes and crimes against humanity. The 
Commission voted to replace the war nexus with a different contextual ele-
ment, namely that crimes against humanity be committed “by the authorities 
of a State or by private individuals acting at the instigation or with the tole-
ration of such authorities.”72
In 1995, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia declared that the requirement that crimes 
against humanity be associated with armed conflict was inconsistent with 
customary law.73 It offered the rather unconvincing explanation that the 
 69 Id. at 56. 
 70 See Summary Record of the 267th Meeting, [1954] I Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n 131, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/SR. 267. 
 71 Id. at 133. The difficult issue was revived, however, and the Commission agreed to 
reopen discussion, referring the matter to a sub-committee. See Summary Record of the 268th 
Meeting, [1954] I Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n 135, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.268; Summary Record 
of the 269th Meeting, [1954] I Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n 142, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.269; 
Summary Record of the 270th Meeting, [1954] I Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n 148, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SR.270.
 72 Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1954] 2 Y.B. Int’l 
L. Comm’n 150, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/Add.1. Recently, the Appeals Chamber of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia declared that a State plan or 
policy is not an element of crimes against humanity under customary law. Prosecutor Kuna-
rac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, para. 98 (June 12, 2002); accord Prosecutor v. 
Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, para. 120 (July 29, 2004); Prosecutor v. Kordic & 
Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, para. 98 (Dec. 17, 2004). 
73 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocu-
tory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 141 (Oct. 2, 1995), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ 
tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm. See also, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 
Judgement, para. 251 (July 15, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/ 
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Security Council had included the nexus in article 5 of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia as a jurisdictional 
limit only.74 The more plausible explanation is that the lawyers in the 
United Nations Secretariat who drafted the Charter believed the nexus to be 
part of customary law, and the Council did not disagree.75
CONCLUSIONS
The concept of the “crime of genocide” emerged in the context of 
the Second World War prosecutions. Raphael Lemkin’s concept easily 
meshed with the agenda of the international prosecutors like Robert Jackson 
who prepared the Nuremberg trial, but anxiety of the major powers about 
the possible scope of crimes against humanity led them to impose a dra-
matic limitation. They were concerned that persecution committed against 
their own subject peoples might also become justiciable at an international 
level. Alongside Jackson’s worries about the apartheid-like treatment of 
African-Americans were the appalling situations in the far-flung colonial 
possessions of the United Kingdom and France, and a host of well-known 
problems within the Soviet Union. The result was that Nuremberg judged 
the Nazis for atrocities committed against their own nationals but only to 
the extent that those atrocities could be linked to the war of aggression and 
that the atrocities took place after September 1, 1939. 
When all of this became perfectly clear, following the IMT’s judg-
ment on September 30 and October 1, 1946, there was widespread dissatis-
faction. Henry King encountered some of it in his meeting with Lemkin a 
few days after the judgment. At about the same time, several “third world” 
States in the General Assembly tried to fix the limitation upon international 
law imposed at Nuremberg by simply defining a different category of 
criminal offence, genocide. They were successful, although the price of 
consensus was a definition that was narrower in many respects than that of 
crimes against humanity. Nevertheless, as article I of the Genocide Conven-
tionmakes perfectly clear, genocide can be committed in time of peace as 
well as in time of war. 
Eventually, the nexus would disappear from the definition of crimes 
judgement/tad-aj990715e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, 
Judgment, para. 23 (Feb. 26, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/kordic/trialc/ 
judgement/kor-tj010226e.pdf. 
74 Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR72.1, Decision on the Interlocutory Appeal 
Concerning Jurisdiction, para. 13 (Aug. 31, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/seselj/ 
appeal/decision-e/040831.htm. 
75 See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 
Two of the Security Council Resolution 808, para. 47, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. 
Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) (agreeing that “crimes against humanity were first recognized 
by the Charter”).  
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against humanity, but it would take half a century for the evolution to be-
come evident. The pronouncement of the Appeals Chamber in 1995 was 
endorsed in article 7 of the Rome Statute.76 But what remains uncertain is 
precisely when the nexus disappeared from the elements of crimes against 
humanity. As far as the International Law Commission was concerned, it 
was present as late as 1950, and perhaps later than that. In 1954, the Com-
mission experimented by removing the nexus but replacing it with another 
contextual element, the State plan or policy. There is something for every-
one in the work of the International Law Commission, which continued to 
toy with the definition of crimes against humanity through the 1990s. Re-
sponsible judges will probably not want to place much reliance on the 
Commission’s deliberations on crimes against humanity over the years as 
evidence of the customary law definition of crimes against humanity. 
Crimes against humanity and genocide certainly belong to the same 
genus of international crime.77 The relationship was recognized in the very 
first prosecution for the crime of genocide. In Eichmann, the District Court 
of Jerusalem described genocide as ‘the gravest type of “crime against hu-
manity.”78 More recently, a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda said: 
The definition of the crime of genocide was based upon that of crimes 
against humanity, that is, a combination of ‘extermination and persecu-
tions on political, racial or religious grounds’ and it was intended to cover 
‘the intentional destruction of groups in whole or in substantial part’ (em-
phasis added). The crime of genocide is a type of crime against humanity. 
Genocide, however, is different from other crimes against humanity. The 
essential difference is that genocide requires the aforementioned specific 
intent to exterminate a protected group (in whole or in part) while crimes 
against humanity require the civilian population to be targeted as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack. There are instances where the discrimina-
tory grounds coincide and overlap.79
A Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the for-
76 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 21(d), July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 
999 [hereinafter ICC Statute], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/official 
journal/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf.
77 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Dosen & Kolundzija, Case No. IT-95-8-I, Judgement on Defence 
Motions to Acquit, para. 58 (Sept. 3, 2001), avaliable at http://www.un.org/icty/sikirica/ 
judgement/010903r98bis-e.pdf. 
78 Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 41 (District 
Court of Jerusalem); Eichmann v. Attorney-General of the Government of Israel, 36 I.L.R. 
277, 288 (Supreme Ct. 1962). 
79 Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement, para. 89 
(May 21, 1999), available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/KayRuz/judgement/ 
index.htm. 
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mer Yugoslavia described genocide as one of the most ‘egregious manifes-
tations’ of crimes against humanity.80 Another Trial Chamber, in Staki,
said it was “a species of crimes against humanity in the broader sense.”81
The view that genocide is an aggravated form of crimes against 
humanity also finds considerable support in academic writing82 and in the 
work of the International Law Commission.83 Yet during the Rome Confer-
ence, and in the work that preceded it, there was no serious suggestion that 
these two cognate concepts be consolidated into a single provision or cate-
gory. Neither definition refers in any way to the other category. Moreover, 
there is also some authority for the existence of meaningful distinctions 
between genocide and crimes against humanity. In one case, a Trial Cham-
ber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda observed that the 
correspondence between genocide and crimes against humanity is not per-
fect. Specifically, crimes against humanity must be directed against a “civil-
ian population,” whereas genocide is directed against “members of a 
group,” without reference to civilian or military status.84 In Musema, the 
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda con-
cluded that the crime against humanity of extermination was not a lesser 
and included form of genocide, because the contextual elements of the two 
crimes differ.85
80 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, paras. 622, 655 (May 
7, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/judgement/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf; 
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 4 U.S.L.W. 2231 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 
3832 (1996). 
81 Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Decision on Rule 98 Bis Motion for Judg-
ment of Acquittal, para. 26 (Oct. 31, 2002). 
82 STEFAN GLASER, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PÉNAL CONVENTIONNEL 109 (1970); See also 
Yoram Dinstein, Crimes Against Humanity, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE 
THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY 891, 905 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996) (“Genocide may be 
looked upon as the most paradigmatic crime against humanity.”); Theodor Meron, Interna-
tional Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 554, 557 (1995) (“Genocide 
requires a particularly heavy burden of proof.”); see also L.C. Green, ‘Grave Breaches’ or 
Crimes Against Humanity, 8 U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY J. LEGAL STUDIES 19, 29 (1998), 
available at http://www.usafa.af.mil/df/dfl/documents/crimhum.doc (stating that genocide is 
the “most extreme example” of a crime against humanity). 
83 See Second report on the draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind, [1984] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n paras. 28–29, U.N. Doc. A/C4/377 and Corr.1 
(Feb. 1, 1984); Other Decisions and Conclusion of the Commision, [1996] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 85, U.N. Doc. A/51/10. 
84 Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, paras. 89, 119 (May 21, 
1999), available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/KayRuz/judgement/index.htm; see 
also Musema v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment, para. 366 (Nov. 16, 2001), 
available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/Musema/judgement/Arret/index.htm. 
85 Musema v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment, para. 366 (Nov. 16,  2001), 
available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/Musema/judgement/Arret/index.htm. For a 
different approach that reconciles extermination and genocide, see Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case 
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To understand the distinctions, and the historic tension, between the 
two categories, we need to return to Nuremberg. Both genocide and crimes 
against humanity were being used to describe the Nazi atrocities directed 
against religious or racial groups, and especially those targeting the Jews. 
The London Conference opted to use the term crimes against humanity. The 
Nazi Holocaust, or Shoah, was addressed under the rubric of crimes against 
humanity.  
Thus, crimes against humanity and genocide were forged in the 
same crucible and were used at Nuremberg almost as if they were syno-
nyms. The distinction only emerged because of the nexus with armed con-
flict that Nuremberg had imposed upon crimes against humanity. Indeed, it 
seems likely that had there been no nexus, there would have been no need to 
define genocide as a distinct international crime. Over the decades that fol-
lowed adoption of the Genocide Convention, the two concepts had an un-
easy relationship. Although crimes against humanity had a broader reach, 
covering acts of persecution falling short of outright physical extermination, 
they were fatally limited by the contextual requirement of an armed conflict. 
Genocide, on the other hand, could be committed in time of peace, but was 
defined narrowly as acts of extermination directed at national, ethnic, racial, 
and religious groups. The Genocide Convention applied prospectively, 
whereas the only international codification of crimes against humanity, in 
the Nuremberg Charter, only applied to the crimes of the European Axis 
Powers. 
There was much frustration with the narrowness of the definition of 
genocide. Schwarzenberger famously remarked that the Genocide Conven-
tion was “unnecessary when applicable and inapplicable when necessary.”86
Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn wrote that “the wording of the Convention 
is so restrictive that not one of the genocidal killings committed since its 
adoption is covered by it.”87 Many, therefore, argued for a dynamic interpre-
tation of the concept of genocide that would include a range of other pro-
tected groups, such as political and social groups, and that would apply to a 
broader range of acts.88 But what they were proposing, in reality, was 
No. IT-98-33-T), Judgment, para. 685 (Aug. 2, 2001), available at http://www.un.org 
/icty/krstic/TrialC1/judgements/krs-tj010802e.pdf (stating that both extermination and geno-
cide “require that the killings be part of an extensive plan to kill a substantial part of a civil-
ian population.”). 
86 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (3rd ed. 1957). 
87 FRANK CHALK & KURT JONASSOHN, THE HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF GENOCIDE 11
(1990).
88 See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Dis-
crimination & Prot. of Minorities, Review of Further Developments in Fields with Which the 
Sub-Comm. has been Concerned, Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 (July 2, 
1985) (prepared by B. Whitaker). 
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equivalent to crimes against humanity without the nexus.
In early 1945, genocide and crimes against humanity were cognates, 
terms devised to describe the barbarous acts of the Nazi regime. Though not 
identical in scope, they neatly overlapped and could be used more or less 
interchangeably to describe the great crime of the era, the attempted exter-
mination of Europe’s Jewish population. By late 1946 an important rift de-
veloped that was not healed until the end of the century. Today, we may 
once again speak of genocide and crimes against humanity as they were 
originally used. The only legal consequence of describing an atrocity as 
genocide rather than as crimes against humanity is the relatively easy access 
to the International Court of Justice offered by article IX of the 1948 Con-
vention. But article IX has generated more heat than light, and the recent 
ruling of the Court in Bosnia v. Serbia should discourage resort to this rem-
edy except in the very clearest of cases.89
The distinction between genocide and crimes against humanity is 
still of great symbolic significance, of course. Many Bosnians were shat-
tered that their suffering during the 1992–1995 war was not labelled geno-
cide, save for the very specific case and ultimately anomalous case of the 
Srebrenica massacre. This was reflected in many negative comments from 
international lawyers about the judgment of the International Court of Jus-
tice.90 Similarly, there was much disappointment when the Commission of 
Inquiry set up pursuant to a Security Council mandate determined that Su-
dan was not committing genocide in Darfur.91 And yet the essence of the 
Bosnian war has been described on countless occasions in the case law of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia as a crime 
against humanity, and the Darfur Commission did the same for the ethnic 
cleansing in Sudan, urging that the situation be referred to the International 
Criminal Court for prosecution: 
The conclusion that no genocidal policy has been pursued and imple-
mented in Darfur by the Government authorities, directly or through the 
militias under their control, should not be taken in any way as detracting 
from the gravity of the crimes perpetrated in that region. International of-
fences such as the crimes against humanity and war crimes that have been 
89 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bos. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91 (Feb. 26); See William A. Scha-
bas, Genocide and the International Court of Justice: Finally, a Duty to Prevent the Crime of 
Crimes, 2 GENOCIDE STUDIES AND PREVENTION 101 (2007) (discussing the judgment). 
90 Antonio Cassese, A Judicial Massacre, GUARDIAN, Feb. 27, 2007; Ruth Wedgwood, 
Bad Day for International Justice, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 8, 2007. 
91 U.N. Sec. Council, Comm’n of Inquiry, Report of the International Commission of 
Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, § II, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Feb. 1, 2005). 
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committed in Darfur may be no less serious and heinous than genocide.92
If their victimization is acknowledged as crimes against humanity, 
the Bosnian Muslims and the Darfur tribes are in good company. After all, 
even though today we speak of the Armenian and Jewish genocides, at the 
time when they were committed crimes against humanity was the applicable 
terminology. Perhaps in the years to come, now that the legal difficulties 
distinguishing genocide and crimes against humanity have been resolved, 
the more popular connotation of these terms will tend to evolve in the same 
direction. 
92 Id.
